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THE “COMITY” OF EMPAGRAN: THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES
THAT FOREIGN COMPETITION REGULATION LIMITS AMERICAN
ANTITRUST JURISDICTION OVER INTERNATIONAL CARTELS
I. INTRODUCTION
The equivocal language of the 1982 Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (“FTAIA”) 1 has led to several disputes
concerning when victims of international price-fixing can bring suit under U.S. antitrust law. The FTAIA vests federal
district courts with subject matter jurisdiction over conduct that “has a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable
effect” on U.S. commerce that “gives rise to a claim” under the Sherman Act. 2 The FTAIA's unique statutory language
offers little guidance for district courts when an international cartel raises the price of a good or service in both domestic
and foreign markets. In that case, does the FTAIA permit foreign plaintiffs injured in foreign markets access to U.S.
federal district courts? Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A.
(“Empagran”) 3 that the doctrine of “comity among nations” limited the reach of U.S. antitrust law over foreign plaintiffs
who claim injury in nations where other competition regulations exist. 4 This decision left unresolved the split between
the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and the Second Circuit over the FTAIA's language and history. Moreover,
the Supreme Court's resort to the existence of foreign regulatory schemes to limit Sherman Act jurisdiction ignored
Congress's intent to deter international cartels and protect American markets.
This Recent Development argues that Empagran misapplies the doctrine of comity. Part II traces the history of the
FTAIA, which was passed to define the limits on participation by American businesses in anticompetitive conduct
overseas. Part III narrates the factual and procedural history of Empagran. Part IV contrasts the Fifth and Second
Circuits' interpretations of the FTAIA. In Part V, the Recent Development analyzes the Supreme Court's ruling in
Empagran, and Part VI outlines the procedurally questionable application of the “comity among nations” doctrine.
Finally, the Recent Development *280 concludes that, by invoking comity, the Supreme Court added to the difficulties
of interpreting the FTAIA.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FTAIA
Since 1909, 5 the Supreme Court has wrestled with the appropriate extra-territorial application of the Sherman and
Clayton Acts. 6 On the one hand, U.S. antitrust laws are the most robust in the world, preserving competition through
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Department of Justice (“DOJ”) actions 7 and awards of treble damages and attorneys' fees to injured private parties. 8 On
the other hand, the disparity between foreign “competition” law and U.S. law frequently disadvantages U.S. businesses. 9
The global economy's increased interdependence after World War II enhanced business's capability to organize
sophisticated cartel arrangements. 10 This development, along with judicial confusion over the appropriate reach of the
antitrust laws, exacerbated the tension. 11 Congress passed the FTAIA to clarify unsettled and conflicting federal court
decisions concerning the extra-territorial reach of U.S. antitrust laws 12 and to “insulate United States business from its
antitrust laws for certain business conducted outside the country ... to assist American business competing abroad.” 13
The text of the FTAIA reads:
*281 Sections 1 to 7 of [the Sherman Act] shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other
than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless—

(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect—

(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign nations, or on import trade or
import commerce with foreign nations; or

(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a person engaged in such trade or commerce
in the United States; and

(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of sections 1 to 7 of this title, other than this section.

If this Act applies to such conduct only because of the operation of paragraph (1)(B), then this Act shall
apply to such conduct only for injury to export business in the United States. 14

The FTAIA gave rise to competing interpretations among U.S. courts about how “direct, substantial and reasonably
foreseeable” an anticompetitive effect must be for resort to American antitrust law. 15 Most recently, a decade-long
conspiracy to inflate the prices of vitamins used in everyday products finally gave the Supreme Court the opportunity
to determine the reach of American antitrust laws under the FTAIA.
III. “VITAMINS, INC.”
The “bulk vitamins industry” refers to those companies involved in the initial processing of “dry-powder” vitamins, an
intermediate component used by independent “blenders” as ingredients in end-use products such as milk and animal
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feed. 16 Beginning in January 1988, officials from two European vitamin manufacturers—F. Hoffmann-La Roche and
BASF—embarked on a price-fixing enterprise for bulk vitamins that expanded to involve every major world vitamin
producer and affected every major world market. 17 Labeling their operation “Vitamins, Inc.,” 18 the cartel members
conspired to inflate prices at this first, *282 “bulk,” stage of the vitamin distribution process. Claiming that they were
holding trade association meetings, they met quarterly and compared sales volumes on country, regional, and worldwide
levels. 19 Generating additional revenues of hundreds of millions of dollars in a $20 billion industry, the conspiracy
directly injured large American companies, including General Mills, Kellogg, Coca-Cola, Tyson Foods, and Procter &
Gamble. 20 In 1999, executives from co-conspirator Rhône-Poulenc came forward under the DOJ's Corporate Leniency
Policy, which provides amnesty for the first member of a cartel to testify, 21 and exposed the cartel in exchange for
immunity from U.S. criminal penalties. 22 Because of Rhône-Poulenc's cooperation, twelve corporate defendants and
thirteen individual defendants reached plea agreements with the DOJ and paid immense fines. 23
Concurrently with DOJ investigations, domestic and foreign vitamin purchasers, including Empagran S.A., the named
plaintiff, filed class action suits under the Sherman and Clayton Acts claiming that the international price-fixing
arrangement directly raised prices in their respective markets, despite the fact that none of the foreign plaintiffs had been
injured while engaged in U.S. commerce. 24 The District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the claims for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that “under [the] FTAIA, a plaintiff must establish that the injuries it seeks to
remedy actually arose from the anticompetitive effects of the defendants' conduct on United States commerce.” 25 The
court applied a reading of the FTAIA issued by the Fifth Circuit in 2001, 26 holding that the Sherman Act applies only
to anticompetitive behavior in U.S. territory. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed, applying the
Second Circuit's 2002 interpretation of the FTAIA, 27 which held that private foreign plaintiffs can bring actions under
the Sherman Act as long as any domestic claim exists; the claim can be made *283 by the U.S. government or by a
party injured as part of domestic commerce. 28 The split provided the opportunity to review the “inelegantly phrased” 29
statute that Congress had passed in order to identify those plaintiffs eligible to resort to U.S. antitrust law.
IV. DISAGREEMENT AMONG THE CIRCUITS
A. The Fifth Circuit Approach
In 1998, Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As (“Statoil”), a Norwegian petroleum corporation, filed suit in the Northern
District of Texas for injuries sustained from a market and price-fixing conspiracy between the world's only three providers
of heavy-lift barge services. 30 The providers divided the market for their services between the Gulf of Mexico and the
North Sea. 31 The court held that the FTAIA limited the “space” for subject matter jurisdiction under the Sherman
Act to injuries sustained in American territory. 32 The court found that it had jurisdiction over activities in American
territorial waters in the Gulf of Mexico. 33 Statoil, however, operated only in the North Sea and had entered no contracts
in the United States nor any that even applied U.S. law. Despite this fact, it claimed that the increased prices it faced
resulted from the same conspiracy that gave rise to antitrust claims for affected American businesses. 34 Nonetheless,
the court dismissed Statoil's complaint under the FTAIA.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling on the jurisdictional issue. 35 Statoil's injury, the court
claimed, “must stem from the effect of higher prices for heavy-lift services in the Gulf.” 36 The court asserted that although
there was a link between the higher prices in the Gulf of Mexico and the North Sea—and thus a close relationship
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between the domestic injury *284 and the plaintiff's claim—it did not “give rise” to the claim. 37 High prices in the Gulf
of Mexico, the “effect,” were not the same as high prices in the North Sea. 38 Should the domestic conduct be allowed
to form the jurisdictional nexus,
any entities, anywhere, that were injured by any conduct that also had sufficient effect on United States
commerce could flock to United States federal court for redress, even if those plaintiffs had no commercial
relationship with any United States market and their injuries were unrelated to the injuries suffered in the
United States. 39

Thus, the Fifth Circuit concluded, the FTAIA does not grant U.S. courts subject matter jurisdiction over claims by
foreign plaintiffs “where the situs of the injury is overseas and that injury arises from effects in a non-domestic market.” 40
B. The Second Circuit Approach
Between 1992 and 2000, the world's largest auction houses, Christie's and Sotheby's, coordinated their buyers' premiums
and sellers' commissions, restricted sellers' ability to negotiate terms of loans before sale of their items, and exchanged
client lists. 41 After an investigation in which Christie's cooperated under a conditional amnesty offered by the DOJ,
a class action lawsuit was certified on behalf of non-U.S. customers who purchased and sold items outside the United
States. 42 The District Court for the Southern District of New York framed the issue as “whether a transnational price
fixing conspiracy that affects commerce both in the United States and in other countries inevitably gives persons injured
abroad in transactions otherwise unconnected with the United States a remedy under our antitrust laws.” 43 The court
dismissed the foreign plaintiffs' action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the FTAIA.
Reversing the district court, the Second Circuit argued that the FTAIA amended the Sherman Act, an act oriented
toward defendants. 44 The FTAIA's plain language suggested that cartels aimed at foreign markets with sufficient effect
upon U.S. commerce would give rise to subject matter jurisdiction.
The court maintained that reading the FTAIA's provision to limit plaintiffs' redress to injuries sustained in domestic
commerce would “conflate [the] *285 FTAIA with the Clayton Act.” 45 Since the Sherman Act “defines substantive
standards that prohibit certain forms of anticompetitive conduct,” 46 the prohibited transaction regarding the auction
houses was the agreement to fix prices, not the imposition of high prices. Since the Clayton Act and the Sherman Act
“operate independently,” no injury needed to be proven for a company or companies to violate the antitrust laws, even
where the conduct was directed at foreign markets. 47 Therefore, the court held that the FTAIA does not determine
which plaintiffs can file suit under the Clayton Act and that “it would be inappropriate to import the element of injury
from the Clayton Act and graft it onto the FTAIA.” 48
The Second Circuit emphasized that the statutory text “gives rise to a claim,” but not specifically to “the plaintiff's
claim.” 49 The court interpreted the statute broadly to allow litigants access to U.S. courts as long as any domestic
claim existed. “The ‘effect’ on domestic commerce need not be the basis for a plaintiff's injury, it only must violate the
substantive provisions of the Sherman Act.” 50 The Second Circuit further ruled that the success of the domestic pricefixing agreement depended on the foreign price-fixing agreement, thus giving rise to Sherman Act jurisdiction. 51
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The Second Circuit offered three responses to the Fifth Circuit's claim that such an interpretation of Sherman Act
jurisdiction would “open the floodgates” to foreign litigants seeking the Clayton Act's generous damages terms. First,
global price-fixing does not inherently rise to actionable conduct under the FTAIA. Interference in global markets must
still satisfy the FTAIA's requirement that the conduct's effect be “direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable.” 52
Second, the evidentiary requirements of Sherman Act claims create “natural limits” to actionable claims. 53 Third, even
in cases where price-fixing arrangements occur in foreign markets, but enhance the likelihood of price-fixing in domestic
markets, American markets benefit from the additional deterrence against conduct affecting foreign markets. 54 In this
way, the Second Circuit decision directly challenged the interpretive and policy holdings of the Fifth Circuit.
V. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
In Empagran, the Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit but did not specifically reject the Second Circuit reasoning
imported by the D.C. Circuit. The *286 Court framed the issue as whether the FTAIA's exemptions apply where
international price-fixing activity “has the requisite domestic effect, and ... also has independent foreign effects giving rise
to the plaintiff's claim.” 55 Observing that the FTAIA had an essentially exclusionary purpose, the Court framed the
FTAIA as “placing all (non-import) activity involving foreign commerce outside the Sherman Act's reach”; the statute
only brings such conduct back within jurisdictional reach if it sufficiently affected American commerce. 56 The Court
rejected a finding of subject matter jurisdiction on two bases: (1) that rules of comity should limit foreign plaintiffs' use
of U.S. laws because of foreign nations' interests, and (2) that the doctrine of comity itself suggests that Congress meant
the FTAIA to be restrictive rather than expansive. 57
A. “Comity Among Nations” as an Instrument To Determine Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court has invoked the customary international legal principle of comity to limit the exercise of jurisdiction
over individuals and corporations associated with a foreign country. 58 Under this rule of statutory interpretation, the
Court assumes that legislators seek to avoid conflict with the laws of foreign sovereigns in the interest of harmonizing
potentially conflicting laws, “a harmony particularly needed in today's highly interdependent commercial world.” 59
Because the statute as interpreted by the Second and D.C. Circuits would raise the possibility of supplanting foreign
law or having a significant impact on other countries' abilities to regulate commercial matters, the Court reasoned that
Congress meant to exclude from U.S. jurisdiction antitrust claims lacking ties to the American market.
The international legal doctrine of comity underpinned and qualified the entire Empagran decision. Insofar as the
Supreme Court's decision addressed the disputed interpretive issues from the Fifth and Second Circuits, it did so with
the proviso that its decision was based on notions of comity. 60 For example, the Court ruled that the Second and
D.C. Circuits' reading of “a claim” could “show that [Empagran's] reading is the more natural reading of the statutory
language .... But ... considerations previously mentioned—those of comity and history—make clear that the respondents'
reading is not consistent with the FTAIA's basic intent.” 61 Justice Breyer's opinion focused on the *287 interests of
foreign sovereigns in regulating their own markets and the potential difficulties arising from resort by foreign plaintiffs to
U.S. courts. Through frequent reference to the narrow question of a separate, foreign injury suffered in a foreign market,
the Court evaded the threshold question of the conduct-effect nexus. The Court left the door open for the large-scale
prosecution of expansive, international cartels in U.S. courts by acknowledging that it would be possible for plaintiffs
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to argue that “without an adverse domestic effect (i.e., higher prices in the United States), the sellers could not have
maintained their international price-fixing arrangement.” 62
B. Comity and Subject Matter Jurisdiction as Separate Questions: Hartford Fire Revisited
In Empagran, Justice Scalia filed a brief concurring opinion restating his dissent in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v.
California. 63 In Hartford Fire, American insurers conspired with major London reinsurers to limit the availability of
commercial general litigation insurance policies that excluded various restrictions on claim availability. 64 Nineteen
states as well as private plaintiffs brought Sherman Act claims against the London reinsurers. The London reinsurers
argued that even though their acts may have been illegal under the Sherman Act, principles of international comity
demanded that since British law did not forbid their conduct, jurisdiction by U.S. courts should “be restrained.” 65
The Hartford Fire majority rejected the argument, determining that “the Sherman Act covers foreign conduct producing
a substantial intended effect in the United States, and that concerns of comity come into play, if at all, only after a court
has determined that the acts complained of are subject to Sherman Act jurisdiction.” 66 Even if a conflict with English
law and policy existed, the Court maintained that considerations of deference were outweighed by the express purpose
of the London reinsurers to affect U.S. commerce and the substantial effect their activities produced. 67 Moreover, since
the London reinsurers were free to conduct business in compliance with the laws of both the United States and the United
Kingdom, no conflict existed. 68 The decision spawned dramatic commentary by legal scholars who argued that it *288
signaled the end of American courts' attempts to balance U.S. antitrust laws with those of foreign countries. 69
In dissent, Justice Scalia asserted that two maxims of statutory interpretation should govern. First, acts of Congress,
absent express contrary intent, are meant to apply only within the territorial United States. 70 Second, even if contrary
intent is expressed, as in the case of the FTAIA, courts should not construe acts of Congress in a way that violates
the law of nations unless no other construction is possible. 71 Scalia argued that the controlling analysis should
therefore be choice-of-law between sovereign governments sharing jurisdiction. 72 Principles of comity demanded that
the court dismiss the action against the London reinsurers because Britain had its own comprehensive regulations for
the reinsurance market, as well as a significant interest in regulating that market. 73
VI. EMPAGRAN: CHOOSING BETWEEN COMPETING SOVEREIGNS
The FTAIA grants U.S. courts broad oversight of increasingly sophisticated cartel behavior made possible by large
multinational companies serving as the sole producers of various specialized goods. In essence, the FTAIA could be read
as Congress's encouragement of American businesses to act as anti-competitively as they wish, as long as they respect
the American economy and refrain from activity that would injure participants in the domestic market. 74 The FTAIA
extends subject matter jurisdiction to federal district courts where anticompetitive conduct (1) “has a direct, substantial
and reasonably foreseeable effect” on non-import foreign trade and (2) “gives rise to a claim.” Beyond this, the FTAIA
is unclear as to how courts should approach antitrust litigation where price-fixing occurs at the supranational level and
affects domestic and foreign markets. Did Congress intend the deterrent effect of the Sherman Act to reach global cartel
behavior by allowing foreign plaintiffs access to generous American damages? Or did Congress only intend for those
affected by raised prices in the American market to be able to obtain Clayton Act relief? This Recent Development asserts
that the Supreme Court's decision to apply notions of comity to answer the question of subject matter jurisdiction under
the FTAIA generally ignores Congress's intent and complicates courts' task in resolving transnational price fixing cases.
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*289 Congress specifically considered comity concerns when passing the FTAIA. 75 The record reflects the view that
courts should first determine subject matter jurisdiction under the statute, and then invoke principles of comity if
necessary. The Supreme Court put the cart before the horse by ruling that it “ordinarily construes ambiguous statutes to
avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other nations.” 76 Under the Court's theory in Empagran,
the initial inquiry into any statute would be the laws and interests of foreign nations, rather than statutory language
or the authority of House Judiciary Committee Reports. In a legal system increasingly grappling with issues of foreign
law, international law, and globalized regulation of international trade, such a theory would turn federal district courts
into ad hoc tribunals of all three at the cost of Congressional efforts to protect American markets in an internationalized
economy.
The Supreme Court might respond that by invoking comity considerations, it assumed that Sherman Act jurisdiction
was proper and therefore held that American adjudication of Empagran's claims would be “unreasonable” given the
defendants' “connections with another state.” 77 That reasoning would represent a significant break with the traditional
functioning of the comity doctrine. Here, when the Court invokes notions of comity, it does not determine subject
matter jurisdiction; it “decides the claim, ruling on the merits that the plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action under
the relevant statute.” 78 However, the FTAIA is a jurisdictional statute. At issue is not a general law whose language
happens to snare unanticipated plaintiffs, 79 but rather a specific Congressional directive to confer jurisdiction in order
to protect American markets by punishing price-fixers who unlawfully raise prices in the United States. It therefore
seems problematic that the Supreme Court would use comity principles to overrule “the more natural reading of the
statutory language.” 80
Even if the Supreme Court had ruled on the relevant jurisdictional tests in the FTAIA statutory language, it is not
axiomatic that the doctrine of comity demands dismissal of Empagran's claims. The list from which to draw inferences
of “unreasonable” jurisdiction is long and ambiguous. 81 The Supreme *290 Court's decision is directly traceable
to the catalogue of briefs submitted by foreign governments, all of which emphasized comity and international law
as justifications to reverse. 82 Two arguments ran throughout those briefs. One was that American antitrust laws,
especially their provisions for treble damages, were not consistent with foreign laws, although each brief emphasized that
cartels were illegal and private parties had the right to compensation. 83 The other was that extending jurisdiction to
private plaintiffs would undermine cooperation between governments on sharing information to discover and prosecute
international cartels. 84
The foreign briefs did not assert that adjudicating claims brought by foreign plaintiffs injured in foreign markets would
violate national law. If one theme emerged from all of the briefs, it is that there is a general international norm against
price fixing. 85 In other words, if a finding of liability is the same in both countries, it would be logical for conflict-oflaws principles to be invoked only on the issue of remedy. 86 The Supreme Court rejected that reasoning. *291 87 This
rejection is puzzling, given that cartel formation is universally predatory and disruptive of commerce, and a broad, global
opinio juris appears to have developed against the practice. 88 It also reinforces the idea that the decision to withhold
application of American law demands greater scrutiny than the Empagran court, or the Hartford Fire dissent, suggest.
Determining whether a state has exercised “unreasonable” jurisdiction over a person or activity is inherently
discretionary. Notwithstanding this point, the Supreme Court neglected elements of antitrust law that would limit foreign
plaintiffs' Sherman and Clayton Act claims. American antitrust laws do not provide treble damages remedies for all
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injuries from a Sherman Act violation. Rather, foreign plaintiffs injured in foreign markets must still satisfy standing
requirements under the Clayton Act. 89 The relevant language for purposes of determining jurisdiction under the FTAIA
is the requirement for “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect.” 90 It is exactly that language that is shared
by the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, the FTAIA, and the accompanying House
Judiciary Committee Report suggesting that an international cartel whose actions raised prices in the U.S. market would
satisfy the FTAIA's jurisdictional requirements:
Any major activities of an international cartel would likely have the requisite impact on United States
commerce to trigger United States subject matter jurisdiction. For example, if a domestic export cartel
were so strong as to have a “spillover” effect on commerce within this country—by creating a world-wide
shortage or artificially inflated world-wide price that had the effect of raising domestic prices—the cartel's
conduct would fall within the reach of our antitrust laws. Such an impact would, at *292 least over time,
meet the test of a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect on domestic commerce. 91

Moreover, considerations of venue and personal jurisdiction, respectively, would ensure that claims are adjudicated in the
most appropriate forum and that the Sherman Act does not become the world's antitrust law. 92 Finally, the evidentiary
standards for proving Sherman Act violations are difficult to satisfy. 93 The underlying presumption in the amici briefs
was that private plaintiffs became free riders on the admissions of guilt made under the DOJ Amnesty Program; at least
in the case of “Vitamins, Inc.,” the process of private litigation produced evidence used by the DOJ in its investigation. 94
However, procedural requirements are not waived through a finding of subject matter jurisdiction, and each gives rise
to an additional opportunity to invoke comity as a restrictive instrument.
Empagran's silence on the FTAIA's language virtually guarantees the continued cycle of inconsistent judgments about
how American courts should approach global cartels, their organizers, and their victims. Empagran does not even clarify
the point of initial inquiry for district courts. Should they first look to the existence of an alternative, national system of
regulation, or must they focus on the relationship between prices in the United States and abroad? The issue of intended
jurisdiction lay at the heart of the dispute between the Fifth and Second Circuits. While the Fifth Circuit argued that
Congress intended to exclude wholly foreign transactions, 95 the Second Circuit concluded that large, transnational
cartels produced exactly the domestic effect Congress had intended to deter. 96 As examined above, the Empagran
decision appears neither to satisfy nor to resolve any of the principles advanced by the Fifth and Second Circuits. The
Court subordinated the statute's meaning to the interests of foreign governments.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Empagran decision confused comity jurisprudence while lending little clarity to the difficult debate about the
FTAIA's jurisdictional reach. The status of foreign plaintiffs injured abroad by international cartels remains in limbo. It
is difficult to ignore the House Judiciary Committee Report describing *293 an international cartel similar to “Vitamins,
Inc.” and the report's explicit conclusion that it was a justified target of American antitrust laws. The Supreme Court
will undoubtedly confront the question of the relationship between domestic and foreign injury in the near future,
perhaps from the same litigants. Absent from this Recent Development, as they were from the Empagran decision, are the
empirical claims of both Empagran and F. Hoffmann-La Roche that expanding U.S. jurisdiction over antitrust claims
would alternatively enhance deterrence of international cartels 97 or hinder international cooperation and evidence
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gathering. 98 Also left for another discussion is the claim that the doctrine of comity is becoming increasingly antiquated
in the context of a globalized economy. 99 While such analyses are important, as an initial matter the Court should seize
its next opportunity to address the language of the FTAIA. The Court should provide an interpretation that relies on
Congress' intent regarding the reach of antitrust law, rather than on the goals of foreign legislatures.
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15 U.S.C. § 6a (2004).

15

See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 n.23 (1993) (“Also unclear is whether [FTAIA's] ‘direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect’ standard amends existing law or merely codifies it.”); United States v. Nippon
Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1997) (“The FTAIA is inelegantly phrased and the court in Hartford Fire declined
to place any weight on it.”).

16

See Harry First, The Vitamins Case: Cartel Prosecutions and the Coming of International Competition Law, 68 ANTITRUST
L.J. 711 (2001).

17

See Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 342 (D.C. Cir. 2003). See also JULIAN L. CLARKE &
SIMON J. EVENETT, THE DETERRENT EFFECTS OF NATIONAL ANTI-CARTEL LAWS: EVIDENCE FROM
THE INTERNATIONAL VITAMIN CARTEL 7 (AEI-Brookings Ctr. for Reg. Stud., Working Paper No. 02-13, 2002);
Lily Henning, Antitrust Goes Global, PHARM. & MED. DEVICE L. BULL., Nov. 14, 2003, at 3.

18

See John R. Wilke & Susan Warren, Vitamin Makers Plead Guilty, to Pay Record Fine of $725 Million, WALL ST. J., May
21, 1999, at A3.

19

United States Department of Justice (DOJ) U.S.S.G. § 8C4.1 Mot. for Departure and Mem. in Supp. at 4, United States v.
F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21963 (No. 03-724). See also First, supra note 16, at 715 n.12.

20

See Stephen Labaton, The World Gess Tough on Fixing Prices, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2001, at C1. This gave rise to the plausible
conclusion that American consumers were harmed as well. In the dramatic words of DOJ Antitrust Division head, Joel Klein,
the conspiracy “hurt the pocket book of virtually every American consumer, anyone who took a vitamin, drank a glass of
milk, or had a bowl of cereal.” Julie Wolf, EC to Investigate Vitamin Price Fixing, GUARDIAN, May 22, 1999, at 27.

21

For a corporation to receive this leniency, it “must, inter alia, be the first involved party to come forward, at a time when the
government lacks evidence ‘likely to result in a sustainable conviction,”’ First, supra note 16, at 715 n.14.

22

See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1-2, Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche
Ltd., 315 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (No. 03-724).

23

Id. at 2. One corporate defendant agreed to a $500 million fine, the largest fine ever levied by the DOJ, while another was
fined $225 million. First, supra note 16, at 715.

24

See Andrew Stanger, Note, Analyzing U.S. Antitrust Jurisdiction over Foreign Parties After Empagran S.A. v. F. HoffmanLaRoche, Ltd., 2003 BYU L. REV. 1453, 1468-69 (2003). The plaintiffs were foreign vitamin distributors located in Ukraine,
Australia, Ecuador, and Panama, who bought vitamins outside the United States for delivery outside the United States.

25

Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d at 340.

26

Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac V.o.f., 241 F.3d 420, 420-31 (5th Cir. 2001).

27

See Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002).

28

Empagran, 315 F.3d at 350 (modifying the Second Circuit decision by ruling that the Circuit's separation of the Sherman and
Clayton Acts was artificial; that “a claim” required a private plaintiff to have a claim arising out of U.S. domestic commerce;
and that a claim by the U.S. government alone was insufficient).

29

United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1997).

30

Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 422 (also noting that under “the alleged arrangement, the defendants agreed that HeereMac and
McDermott would have exclusive access to heavy-lift projects in the Gulf of Mexico, while Saipem would receive a higher
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allocation of North Sea projects in exchange for staying out of the Gulf. The defendants also allegedly agreed to submit
embellished bids on heavy-lift projects.” Id.).

31

Id.

32

Id. at 423 (“‘Statoil's damages arise from its projects in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea’; thus, the FTAIA's requirement
that the effect on domestic commerce ‘gives rise’ to the antitrust claim was not satisfied. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a(2). The court also
held that the defendants' conspiracy ‘did not have a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable anticompetitive effect on
United States trade or commerce’ under the FTAIA. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1).”).

33

Id.

34

Id. at 422.

35

Id. at 426 (“Therefore, we doubt that foreign commercial transactions between foreign entities in foreign waters is conduct
cognizable by federal courts under the Sherman Act.”).

36

Id. at 427 (emphasis added) (also noting that “the higher prices American companies allegedly paid for services provided by
the McDermott defendants in the Gulf of Mexico does not give rise to Statoil's claim that it paid inflated prices for HeereMac
and Saipem's services in the North Sea.”).

37

Id.

38

Id.

39

Id. at 427-28.

40

Id. at 428.

41

Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 390-91 (2d Cir. 2002).

42

Id. at 391.

43

Id. at 392 (quoting Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 129 F. Supp. 2d 620, 623-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).

44

See id. at 397.

45

Id.

46

Id.

47

Id.

48

Id. at 398.

49

Id. at 399 (emphasis added).

50

Id.

51

See id. at 401.

52

Id. at 402 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (2004)).

53

Id. at 402-03.

54

Id. at 403.
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55

F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 124 S. Ct. 2359, 2365 (2004) (emphasis added).

56

Id.

57

Id. at 2369.

58

Id. at 2366 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 403(1),
403(2) (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS]).

59

Empagran, 124 S. Ct. at 2366. The Restatement is the traditional authority cited for invoking the “comity of nations”: “Even
when one of the bases for jurisdiction ... is present, a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person
or activity having connections with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable.” RESTATEMENT
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 58, § 403(1).

60

Empagran, 124 S. Ct. at 2372.

61

Id. (“Linguistically speaking, a statute can apply and not apply to the same conduct, depending upon other circumstances;
and those other circumstances may include the nature of the lawsuit .... It also makes linguistic sense to read the words ‘a
claim’ as if they refer to the ‘plaintiff's claim’ or ‘the claim at issue.”’).

62

Id.

63

Id. at 2373 (Scalia, J., concurring).

64

Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 773-76 (1993).

65

Id. at 795-96.

66

Id. at 798 n.24 (emphasis added).

67

See id. at 798.

68

See id. at 799. See also United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1997) (“The conduct with which
NPI is charged is illegal under both Japanese and American laws, thereby alleviating any founded concern about NPI being
whipsawed between separate sovereigns.”).

69

See, e.g., Salil K. Mehra, Deterrence: The Private Remedy and International Antitrust Cases, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L.
L. 275 (2002); Spencer Weber Waller, The Twilight of Comity, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 562 (2000).

70

Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 814 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

71

See id. at 815.

72

See id. (citing Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 383 (1959) (“The controlling considerations in this
choice-of-law analysis were the interacting interests of the United States and of foreign countries.”)).

73

See id. at 819 (citing RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 58, § 403(2)(g)).

74

See Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 395 (2d Cir. 2002).

75

See H.R. REP. NO. 97-686 at 13 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2498 (“If a court determines that the
requirements for subject matter jurisdiction are met, [the FTAIA] would have no effect on the ... ability to employ notions of
comity ... or otherwise to take account of the international character of the transaction.”).

76

F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 124 S. Ct. 2359, 2367 (2004).
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RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 58, § 403(1).

78

Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

79

See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953). In Lauritzen, a Danish sailor, on a Danish-owned ship whose guiding
articles stated disputes were to be governed under Danish law, brought a Jones Act claim after being injured in a Cuban port.
The Supreme Court ruled that Danish law should apply.

80

Empagran, 124 S. Ct. at 2372.

81

Id. at 2367 (citing RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, which provides that unreasonable jurisdiction may be
determined by considering: “(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to which the
activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory; (b) the
connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the regulating state and the person principally
responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation is designed to protect; (c) the
character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states
regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted; (d) the existence of
justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation; (e) the importance of the regulation to the international
political, legal, or economic system; (f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international
system; (g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and (h) the likelihood of conflict
with regulation by another state.” RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 58, § 403(2).).

82

See Brief for the Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal at 1, F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd., et al. v.
Empagran, S.A., et al., 124 S. Ct. 2359 (2004) (No. 03-724) (“[p]rinciples of international law and comity also come into play
when U.S. courts consider whether they should exercise the broadest possible jurisdiction authorized by a statute ....”); Brief
of the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 4, F.
Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd., et al. v. Empagran, S.A., et al., 124 S. Ct. 2359 (2004) (No. 03-724) (“The [D.C. Circuit's] holding
thus directly conflicts with the well-established principle that United States statutes are to be construed to avoid conflict with
other nations' laws and to avoid unreasonableness in the exercise of U.S. courts' jurisdiction”; Brief of the Government of
Japan as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2, F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd., et al. v. Empagran, S.A., et al., 124 S. Ct.
2359 (2004) (No. 03-724) (“Giving foreign purchasers the right to damages for purely foreign market transactions undermines
the important principle of comity, respect due to a sovereign nation to regulate conduct within its national territory.”).

83

See, e.g., Brief of the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners
at 11, F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd., et al. v. Empagran, S.A., et al., 124 S. Ct. 2359 (2004) (No. 03-724), and Brief of the
Government of Japan as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 6-7, F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd., et al. v. Empagran,
S.A., et al., 124 S. Ct. 2359 (2004) (No. 03-724).

84

See, e.g., Brief of the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners
at 24, F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd., et al. v. Empagran, S.A., et al., 124 S. Ct. 2359 (2004) (No. 03-724) and Brief for the
Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal at 17, F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd., et al. v. Empagran, S.A.,
et al., 124 S. Ct. 2359 (2004) (No. 03-724).

85

Henning, supra note 16, at 3 (“More than 100 countries worldwide now have some form of anti-cartel laws.”).

86

See, e.g., Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 384 (1959) (invoking “comity” of nations because of foreign
interests in regulating remedies to maritime injuries).

87

Empagran, 124 S. Ct. at 2368 (“Courts would have to examine how foreign law, compared with American law, treats not
only price fixing but also, say, information-sharing agreements, patent-licensing price conditions, territorial product resale
limitations, and various forms of joint venture, in respect to both primary conduct and to remedy. The legally and economically
technical nature of that enterprise means lengthier proceedings, appeals, and more proceedings—to the point where procedural
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costs and delays could themselves threaten interference with a foreign nation's ability to maintain the integrity of its own
antitrust enforcement system.”).

88

See Romero, 358 U.S. at 384 (“To impose on ships the duty of shifting from one standard of compensation to another as
the vessel passes the boundaries of territorial waters would be not only an onerous but also an unduly speculative burden,
disruptive of international commerce and without basis in the expressed policies of this country.”).

89

See Associated Gen. Contractors v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1983) (citing Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 760 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“An antitrust violation may be expected to cause ripples of harm
to flow through the Nation's economy; but ‘despite the broad wording of § 4 there is a point beyond which the wrongdoer
should not be held liable.’ It is reasonable to assume that Congress did not intend to allow every person tangentially affected
by an antitrust violation to maintain an action to recover threefold damages for the injury to his business or property.”)).

90

15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (2004).

91

Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 401 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 97-686 at 26 (1982)).

92

See Joel A. Christie, D.C. Circuit Authorizes Foreign Firms to Sue in Federal Court for Foreign Injuries, METROPOLITAN
CORP. COUNSEL, Mar. 2003, at 12.

93

See, e.g., Marsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).

94

See, generally, First, supra note 16, at 715.

95

Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac v.o.f., 241 F.3d 420, 429 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that a “transaction between
two foreign firms, even if American-owned, should not, merely by virtue of the American ownership, come within the reach of
our antitrust laws .... It is thus clear that wholly foreign transactions as well as export transactions are covered by the FTAIA,
but that import transactions are not.”).

96

Kruman, 284 F.3d at 401.

97

See, e.g., Brief for Certain Professors of Economics as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 13, F. Hoffman-La Roche,
Ltd., et al. v. Empagran, S.A., et al., 124 S. Ct. 2359 (2004) (No. 03-724) (“The penalties embedded in U.S. antitrust laws are
appropriate for domestic conspiracies because they presuppose an alignment of the scope of the cartelized market and the
scope of enforcement. Allowing foreign claims in U.S. courts extends this principle to international conspiracies, establishing a
level of deterrence comparable to what the current law achieves for domestic conspiracies.”); Brief of Amici Curiae Economists
Joseph E. Stiglitz and Peter R. Orszag in Support of Respondents at 3, F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd., et al. v. Empagran, S.A.,
et al., 124 S. Ct. 2359 (2004) (No. 03-724) (“A deterrence perspective thus suggests that it would substantially further the
underlying goals of U.S. antitrust law to allow private civil suits by foreign plaintiffs in the United States, even when such
suits seek recovery based on foreign transactions by the global cartel.”).

98

See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 20, F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd., et al.
v. Empagran, S.A., et al., 124 S. Ct. 2359 (2004) (No. 03-724) (“The court of appeals' interpretation of Section 6a would
undermine the effectiveness of the government's amnesty program. Even those conspirators who come forward and receive
amnesty from criminal prosecution still face exposure to private treble damage actions under 15 U.S.C. 15(a).”).

99

See Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.—Oct. 1997, at 183, 183.
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